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I.

INTRODUCTION

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Chevron Pipe Line Company and
Northwest Terminalling Company ("Chevron") for two independent reasons. Acting well within its
discretion, the district court held that Robby and Kim Mowrey (the "Mowreys") should be judicially
estopped from proceeding with this lawsuit because they failed to disclose their claim against
Chevron in bankruptcy despite knowing about the facts giving rise to the lawsuit at the time they
filed and during the many years that followed. In the alternative, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Chevron because the Mowreys were not the real party in interest to pursue their
claim for damages. Both of these rulings were correct and should be affirmed.
Seeking to overturn the district court's decision, the Mowreys ignore this Court's
formulation of the judicial estoppel doctrine and instead rely on sound bites from various state and
federal courts around the country. By citing these decisions, the Mowreys attempt to interject
additional elements in Idaho's common law application of judicial estoppel that this Court has
never recognized or required and, in fact, has rejected. The Mowreys suggest, for example, that
Chevron had a burden to show intent to conceal, prejudice to the parties, and that the debt
discharged in bankruptcy court had a nexus or privity with the current claim against Chevron.
However, this Court has never required a showing of intent to conceal. It has also specifically
rejected prejudice and privity as prerequisites to application of judicial estoppel.
In a one-paragraph argument that includes no citation to cases or statutes, the Mowreys
also note their disagreement with the district court's reasoned decision that they are not the real
party in interest to proceed with this lawsuit. The Mowreys have not, however, appropriately
raised this issue because they have not cited any cases or statutes in support. Even if the Mowreys
had properly raised the issue, they have not articulated any reason for reversal of the district
court's decision. It is undisputed that the Mowreys failed to disclose this lawsuit in bankruptcy
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and the trustee has not adjudicated or abandoned the claim to the Mowreys. It is likewise
undisputed that the trustee never moved to participate as a party, despite having knowledge of the
issue and an ample opportunity to do so. The district court correctly granted summary judgment
in Chevron's favor as a result.
The Mowreys have not explained how the district court's application of judicial estoppel
was an abuse of discretion or adequately raised the issue regarding real party in interest. The
Mowreys thus make no legitimate argument on appeal; the district court should be affirmed, and
Chevron is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees because the Mowreys' appeal is frivolous
and without foundation.

II.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE.

The Mowreys' allegations of personal injury are irrelevant to the issue whether the district
court acted within its discretion by applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel to the facts of this
case and holding that the Mowreys are not the real party in interest to maintain their claim.
The nature of this appeal centers on the integrity of the judicial system and on the obligations of
debtors in bankruptcy to make complete disclosure of all their assets.

B.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS.

1.

Robby Mowrey Was Injured on June 29, 2005.

According to the Mowreys' complaint, Robby Mowrey was injured on June 29, 2005 at a
petroleum loading facility owned or operated by Chevron. R. Vol. I, pp. 3-4, iii! 9-11. Mowrey
alleges that he suffered "substantial and permanent injury" in the accident and was incapacitated
as a result. Id.,

iii! 11-13.
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2.

The Mowreys Filed Bankruptcy and Swore to the Bankruptcy Court That
They had $0.00 in Contingent and Unliquidated Claims.

On September 8, 2005, approximately three months after the accident, the Mowreys filed
a Voluntary Petition for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District ofldaho, Case No. 05-42048-JDP (hereinafter the "bankruptcy petition"). R. Vol. I,
pp. 33-74. According to the bankruptcy petition, the Mowreys were "not represented" by counsel.
R. Vol. I, p. 33.
The bankruptcy petition included "Schedule B - Personal Property" (hereinafter
"Schedule B"). R. Vol. I, pp. 54-58. Schedule B, which purported to list all of the Mowreys'
personal property, included a section for the Mowreys to disclose "Other contingent and
unliquidated claims of every nature, including tax refunds, counterclaims of the debtor, and rights
to setoff claims." R. Vol. I, p. 57, if 20. The Mowreys did not disclose any claim against
Chevron on Schedule B and, instead, listed $0.00 in contingent and unliquidated claims. Id.
The bankruptcy petition also included the Plaintiffs' "Unsworn Declaration under Penalty
of Perjury" whereby the Plaintiffs declared "under penalty of perjury that we have read the
foregoing schedules, A through J, and that they are true and correct to the best of our knowledge,
information, and belief." R. Vol. I, p. 49. The Mowreys concede submitting the schedule to the
bankruptcy court. App. Br. at 2.

3.

The Bankruptcy Court Discharged Approximately $15,000 in Debt Based
On the Mowreys' Inaccurate Schedules.

The Mowreys' bankruptcy petition also included "Schedule F - Creditors Having
Unsecured Nonpriority Claims" (hereinafter "Schedule F"). In Schedule F, the Mowreys
disclosed approximately $15,000 of debt owed to unsecured nonpriority creditors. R. Vol. I, p. 65.
On or about December 18, 2005, based on their representations made to the bankruptcy court in
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the bankruptcy petition and schedules, the Mowreys obtained a discharge of their debts pursuant
to Section 727, Title 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. R. Vol. I, p. 75.
4.

The Mowreys Knew of Their Potential Claim Against Chevron But Did Not
Amend Their Bankruptcy Schedules.

On or about June 5, 2006, after the Mowreys received a discharge of their debts, the trustee
moved the bankruptcy court to reopen the Mowreys' bankruptcy on grounds that the trustee
discovered that the Mowreys were entitled to a 2005 tax refund that should have been part of the
bankruptcy estate. R. Vol. I, p. 78. At the same time and by their own admission, "[d]uring, or
immediately prior to, July 2006, the Plaintiffs were advised by the claims representative for the
Idaho State Insurance Fund to consult with an attorney regarding the worker's compensation claim
of Plaintiff Robby Mowrey." R. Vol. I, pp. 105-06, if 6. Shortly thereafter, the Mowreys retained
an attorney who specifically told them they had a potential claim against Chevron. R. Vol. I,
p. 106, if 6, p. 122, if 6 ("In July, 2006, debtors retained an attorney ... and at that time discovered
for the first time that they had a potential third party claim as a result of the accident."); see also
R. Vol. I, pp. 96-97, 100.
Throughout 2006, despite the fact that the bankruptcy had been reopened and knowing that
they had a potential claim against Chevron, the Mowreys did not alert the bankruptcy court or the
bankruptcy trustee to the worker's compensation claim or to the potential claim they had against
Chevron. Instead, the Mowreys filed a single amendment to their bankruptcy petition in an attempt
to keep the 2005 tax return for themselves. See R. Vol. 1, p. 80. Specifically, they filed an
"Amended Schedule C - Property Claimed as Exempt," but the Mowreys did not file an "Amended
Schedule B - Personal Property" to disclose the worker's compensation claim or the claim against
Chevron.
On May 4, 2007, again relying on the representations made by the Mowreys, the
bankruptcy court entered an Order Approving Trustee's Supplemental Final Report, Discharging
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL - 4

Trustee, and Closing the Estate. R. Vol. 1, p. 81. Because of the representations made by the
Mowreys under the penalty of perjury in the bankruptcy court, they received the advantage of a
discharge of their debt. They also received the benefit of the automatic stay, which prevented
any creditors from maintaining actions against them during pendency of the bankruptcy. See
11 U.S.C. § 362.

5.

The Mowreys Then Sued Chevron But Still Did Not Alert the Bankruptcy
Court to the Claim.

On June 19, 2007, only six weeks after the bankruptcy court closed the Mowreys'
reopened bankruptcy, the Mowreys filed the complaint against Chevron in this matter. See
R. Vol. I, pp. 1-6. The Mowreys later filed an amended complaint on June 19, 2007. Id, pp. 7-13.
Trial was initially set for February 3, 2009, but the Mowreys moved to continue the trial, first in
December 2008, then in August 2009, May 2010, September 2010, and again in December 2010.
From the date of the bankruptcy petition (September 8, 2005) to the date Chevron filed
their motion for summary judgment (January 18, 2011 )-a period of over five years-the
Mowreys did not once move to reopen their bankruptcy case or amend their schedules to list
their claim against Chevron.

6.

The Mowreys Belatedly Moved to Reopen Their Bankruptcy Case.

In January 2011, in direct response to Chevron's motion for summary judgment, the
Mowreys moved to reopen their bankruptcy case and, for the first time, sought leave to amend
their inaccurate schedules to list the claim against Chevron. R. Vol. I, pp. 121-23. Thereafter,
on January 28, 2011, the bankruptcy court entered an order again reopening the Mowreys'
bankruptcy case. R. Vol. I, p. 129. The bankruptcy court also entered an order authorizing the
Mowreys' counsel, Brent Morgan, to represent the Mowreys and the trustee in this lawsuit.
R. Vol. I, p. 157. That order went no further because the trustee never moved to substitute
himself or to abandon the claim to the Mowreys.
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C.

THE DISTRICT COURT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE MOWREYS'
KNOWING FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THEIR CLAIM AGAINST CHEVRON AND THE TRUSTEE'S
FAILURE TO JOIN THE LAWSUIT.

On July 12, 2011, the district court entered summary judgment in Chevron's favor and
dismissed this lawsuit with prejudice. R. Vol. I, pp. 139-52. The district court's first reason for
decision was that "[t]he elements of judicial estoppel have been met in this case." See R. Vol. I,
p. 147. The district court found that: (1) the Mowreys obtained an advantage through a discharge
of their debt in the bankruptcy court; (2) the advantage was obtained through a declaration made
under the penalty of perjury to the bankruptcy court; and (3) the Mowreys adopted a position
inconsistent with their declaration in this case against Chevron. R. Vol. I, p. 149.
The district court acknowledged that "judicial estoppel is inappropriate in cases of conduct
amounting to nothing more than mistake or inadvertence." R. Vol. I, p. 146. However, the district
court also went on to cite this Court's established precedent that "the knowledge that the party
possesses, or should have possessed, at the time the statement is made is determinative as to
whether that person is 'playing fast and loose' with the court." R. Vol. I, p. 146 (citing McKay v.

Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 155, 937 P.2d 1222, 1229 (1997)).
The district court found that the Mowreys "had knowledge of more than enough facts to
determine that they had a potential cause of action" while their bankruptcy case was pending, but
never modified their petition or schedules. R. Vol. I, p. 148. The district court based this finding
in part on the allegations made in the amended complaint in this case. See, e.g., R. Vol. I, p. 148
("For example, the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleged that Mr. Mowrey 'suffered substantial
and permanent impairment and/or disability' caused by the failure of the Chevron's equipment on
June 29, 2005.") (citing Amended

Complaint,~

15). The district court stated further that ·

"[e]vidence that the Plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of facts enough to realize they had a
potential cause of action against the Chevron is also found by the timing of the filing of the cause
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of action in this matter on June 19, 2007, only six weeks after their bankruptcy estate closed."
R. Vol. I, p. 149.
In the alternative, the district court concluded that the Mowreys "lack standing to bring
their claims against Chevron because the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, and not the Plaintiffs, is
the real party in interest in the cause of action against the Defendants." R. Vol. I, p. 151. The
district court entered summary judgment on this alternative basis.
The Mowreys moved for reconsideration of the summary judgment decision, and the
district court denied the motion in a subsequent written decision. See R. Vol. II, pp. 222-4 3.

III.
1.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

Should this Court award Chevron its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred

in responding to this appeal because the appeal was brought and pursued frivolously and without
foundation?

IV.

ARGUMENT

The district court acted within its discretion and correctly applied the doctrine of judicial
estoppel in granting Chevron's motion for summary judgment and in dismissing the Mowreys'
claim against Chevron. The Mowreys' arguments on appeal are premised on factors and
considerations that are not controlling and have not been adopted in Idaho.
In the alternative, the district court's decision should be affirmed because the district court
properly held that the Mowreys are not the real party in interest to pursue the claim and the trustee
failed to answer or appear, despite having had a reasonable opportunity to do so. For these
reasons, the district court should be affirmed.
Chevron should recover its reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in responding to this appeal
because the Mowreys have not articulated how the district court abused its discretion by applying
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judicial estoppel or adequately raised an argument regarding real party in interest. The appeal has
thus been brought and pursued frivolously and fees are appropriate under Idaho Code§ 12-121.
A.

THIS COURT REVIEWS THE DISTRICT COURT'S APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The Mowreys rightly concede that "[j]udicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, invoked at
the discretion of the court." App. Br. at 15 (citing Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d
492, 502 (2004)). Therefore, the Court should "not overturn a district court's discretionary
application of the judicial estoppel doctrine 'unless it plainly appears that the court committed a
clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon weighing of the proper factors."' Id.

See also Riley v. W.R. Holdings, LLC, 143 Idaho 116, 121-22, 138 P.3d 316, 321-22 (2006).
There are a number of reasons that a district court's application of judicial estoppel is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion as opposed to de nova. See Stallings v. Bussmann Corp., 447
F.3d 1041, 1046 (8th Cir. 2006). For example, "deferential review often is appropriate for matters
in which the trial court is 'better positioned ... to decide the issue in question."' Id. (citations
omitted). "And the district court is in a better position to decide if judicial estoppel applies
because ' [d]etermining whether a litigant is playing fast and loose with the courts has a subjective
element [and] [i]ts resolution draws upon the trier's intimate knowledge of the case at bar and his
or her first hand observations of the lawyers and their litigation strategies.'" Id. (quoting

Alternative Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2004)). Further,
"because judicial estoppel has an 'amorphous nature' and requires flexibility, the flexible abuse of
discretion standard should apply." Id. Finally, most, if not all courts to have addressed this
question have settled unanimously on abuse of discretion. Id.
"A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it ( 1) correctly perceives the issue as
discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and
(3) reaches the decision through an exercise ofreason." Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 Idaho 237, 280
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL- 8

P.3d 740 (2012). In this case, there is no dispute that the district court correctly perceived the
issue as discretionary. See R. Vol. I, pp. 146-4 7 (recognizing that application of judicial estoppel
is subject to the district court's discretion). As discussed below, the district court correctly
identified and applied the appropriate legal standards and reached its decision through an exercise
of reason.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION BY APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL BECAUSE THE MOWREYS MADE INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS,
RECEIVED AN ADVANTAGE, AND KNEW THE FACTS UPON WHICH THE CLAIM IS BASED.

InA&J Construction Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 116 P.3d 12 (2005) this Court cited

to the United States Supreme Court's decision in New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750
(2001 ), which recited "three factors courts may consider when determining whether to apply the
doctrine of judicial estoppel." These factors include the following:
First, courts may look at whether a party's later position is "clearly
inconsistent" with its prior position. . . . Secondly, courts may look
at whether the party succeeded in persuading the court to accept its
prior position, so that acceptance of the later position would create
"the perception that either the first or the second court was misled."
Finally, courts may consider whether the party asserting the
inconsistent position "would derive an unfair advantage or impose
an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped."
A&J Constr. Co, Inc., 141 Idaho at 687, 116 P3d at 17.

The doctrine of judicial estoppel exists to prohibit a "party from assuming a position in one
proceeding and then taking an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding." Riley, 143 Idaho
at 121-22, 138 P.3d at 321-22. The doctrine "is intended to prevent a litigant from playing fast
and loose with the courts." Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d 597, 600 (2008).
While judicial estoppel is inappropriate in cases of conduct amounting to nothing more than
mistake or inadvertence, "the knowledge that the party possesses, or should have possessed, at the
time the statement is made is determinative as to whether that person is 'playing fast and loose'
with the court." Id, 145 Idaho at 236, 178 P.3d at 601 (emphasis added). "Stated another way,
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL - 9

the concept of judicial estoppel takes into account not only what a party states under oath in open
court, but also what that party knew, or should have known, at the time the original position was
adopted." Id, 145 Idaho at 235-36, 178 P.3d at 600-01 (quoting McKay, 130 Idaho at 155, 937
P.2d at 1229).
The district court acted within its discretion when it held that (1) the Mowreys made a
sworn statement that is "clearly inconsistent" with their current position; (2) the Mowreys
persuaded the bankruptcy court to apply their former position by granting them stay and
discharge; and (3) the Mowreys obtained an advantage through the inconsistent statements.
The undisputed facts support the district court's findings on each of these elements. Furthermore,
the record supports the district court's finding that the Mowreys knew the facts upon which their
claim against Chevron is based at the time they made the inconsistent sworn statements.
1.

By Bringing This Lawsuit, the Mowreys Have Taken an Inconsistent Position.

The district court correctly recognized the Mowreys' inconsistent statement in its order
granting summary judgment. R. Vol. I, pp. 141-4 7. The Mowreys do not dispute, and thus
concede, that they took an inconsistent position by declaring that they had "$0.00" in contingent
and unliquidated claims while maintaining a lawsuit against Chevron seeking to recover hundreds
of thousands of dollars. Thus, the district court correctly applied the relevant legal standards to the
first New Hampshire factor and found that it had been satisfied. See A&J Const. Co., Inc., 141
Idaho at687, 116 P.3d at 17 (citing New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750).
2.

The Mowreys Concede That the Bankruptcy Court Relied on Their Sworn
Statements.

The district court found that the bankruptcy court and trustee relied on the Mowreys'
sworn statement that they had "$0.00" in contingent and unliquidated claims and that they
received a discharge in bankruptcy based on those claims. Id The Mowreys do not dispute this
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finding on appeal and thus concede this factor too. Once again, the district court correctly
identified and applied the applicable legal standard. Id.

3.

The Mowreys Received the Advantage of the Automatic Stay and the
Advantage of a Discharge of Their Debt.

The district court also found that the Mowreys obtained an advantage through their sworn
statements before the district court. R. Vol. I, p. 149. The Mowreys seek to overturn this finding
on appeal, arguing that they did not avail themselves of any "advantage" by omitting their claim
against Chevron. App. Br. at 18-19. But this Court has specifically held that application of the
automatic stay and a discharge of debt is an "advantage" sufficient to satisfy the benefit element of
judicial estoppel. A&J Constr. Co., Inc., 141 Idaho at 687, 116 P .3d at 17 (citing Hamilton v. State

Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir. 2001)). Given this express holding by this Court
in A&J Construction Co., Inc., the Mowreys cannot dispute that they received a benefit by obtaining
discharge in bankruptcy based on their inaccurate and incomplete disclosures.

4.

The Mowreys Cannot Argue Inadvertence Because They Knew Facts Giving
Rise to the Lawsuit When Filing Bankruptcy.

Seeking to distract the Court from the undisputed facts of this matter, the Mowreys
contend that "[t]he district court abused its discretion, as there was no evidence in the record
that the Mowreys' conduct was anything other than a good faith omission or an inadvertent
oversight." App. Br. at 16. This is a plain misstatement of the record and the law. The Court
made specific findings as to the knowledge the Mowreys had at the time they filed for bankruptcy,
and that knowledge is determinative as to whether the Mowreys were "playing fast and loose"
with the court. Heinze, 145 Idaho at 235-36, 178 P.3d at 600-01. Moreover, even if the record
regarding knowledge were not so clear, the district court would have had the discretion to apply
the doctrine of judicial estoppel to the record before it. See, e.g., Riley, 143 Idaho at 121-22, 138
P.3d at 321-22 (abuse of discretion standard applies).
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The district court concluded that even before the Mowreys filed their bankruptcy petition
they "had knowledge of more than enough facts to determine that they had a potential cause of
action against the Defendants." R. Vol. I, p. 148. The district court based its decision on
representations made by the Mowreys in their amended complaint in this case. The district court
noted the following averments made by the Mowreys in their pleadings:
•

"Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleged that Mr. Mowrey 'suffered substantial
and permanent impairment and/or disability' caused by the failure of the
Defendants' equipment on June 29, 2005." R. Vol. I, p. 148 (citing Amended
Complaint, iI 15).

•

"Plaintiffs stated Mr. Mowrey was injured when he was moving a swing arm at
the Defendants' facility." R. Vol. I, p. 148.

•

"[T]he swing arm collapsed onto the body of the Plaintiff, striking the Plaintiff in
the hip and knocking him to the ground, where the Plaintiff landed sharply and
very hard on his leg, hip, and back, sustaining serious injuries ... " R. Vol. I,
p. 148 (citing Amended Complaint, iI 14).

•

"These injuries have severely and adversely affected [Mr. Mowrey's] health,
strength and physical and mental condition; said Plaintiff has had to undergo
substantial medical treatment as a result of said injuries to include, but not limited
to, cervical, dorsal and lumbosacral strain and sprain, injury to his right leg and
calf; injury to his hip; disc herniation and/or protusion at L4-5, L5-S 1 and C3-4;
and, in various other ways suffered serious and severe bodily injuries." R. Vol. I,
p. 148 (citing Amended Complaint, iI 15).

Thus, the district court appropriately concluded that "[b]y the very wording of the
Complaint, the Plaintiffs had knowledge that Mr. Mowrey had suffered 'serious and severe bodily
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injuries' as a result of the Defendants' swing arm 'collaps[ing] onto' him on June 25, 2005."
R. Vol. I, pp. 148-49. The district court further supported its conclusion stating that "[e]vidence
that the Plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of facts enough to realize they had a potential cause of
action against the Defendants is also found by the timing of the filing of the cause of action in this
matter on June 19, 2007, only six weeks after their bankruptcy estate closed." R. Vol. I, p. 149.
The Mowreys' own admissions, that they were fully aware of the facts giving rise to the claim in
this case even before they filed the bankruptcy petition, are determinative as to whether they were
playing fast and loose with the court. See Heinze, 145 Idaho at 235, 178 P.3d at 600. Here, the
district court correctly recognized the undisputed facts, identified the appropriate legal authority,
and acted within its discretion when it applied judicial estoppel.

5.

The Mowreys Failed To Amend Their Bankruptcy Schedules Despite Being
Counseled on a Potential Claim in 2006 and Filing the Lawsuit in 2007.

"The duty to disclose all assets and potential assets continues after the initial filing since a
debtor is required to amend his or her financial statements if circumstances change." A&J Constr.
Co., Inc., 141 Idaho at 686, 116 P .3d at 16 (citations omitted). Even if, for the sake of argument,

the Mowreys did not know of the facts supporting their claims at the time of bankruptcy, they
were later specifically counseled that they had claims and yet did not amend their bankruptcy
schedules.
By the Mowreys' own affidavits, they were specifically made aware of their claim against
Chevron while their bankruptcy estate was open. See R. Vol. I, p. 100, ii 8; R. Vol. I, pp. 96-97,

ii 7.

And there can be no dispute that they knew of their claim in June 2007 when they filed their

lawsuit. R. Vol. I, pp. 1-13.
The district court correctly recognized these facts in its order:
•

"In June of2006, nearly one year after Mr. Mowrey was injured by the Defendant's
alleged negligence, the Plaintiffs had another opportunity to disclose their claims
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when their bankruptcy estate was reopened, and they could have filed an amended
Schedule B." R. Vol. I, p. 149.
•

"Nearly another year passed before their bankruptcy estate was finally closed on
May 4, 2007." R. Vol. I, p. 149.

•

"Indeed, the Plaintiffs failed to disclose their claims against the Defendants at any
time before their bankruptcy estate closed on May 4, 2007." R. Vol. I, p. 148.

•

"Plaintiff had nearly two years from the time of Mowrey's accident to make the
necessary disclosures on their bankruptcy schedule." R. Vol. I, p. 149.

Despite all of these facts, which were undisputed below and are unchallenged on appeal,
the Mowreys remained silent and received the benefit of the automatic stay and a discharge of their
debt.
The district court acted well within its discretion by applying judicial estoppel to the facts
of this case, which include the Mowreys' sworn statement in bankruptcy, their subsequent
discharge in bankruptcy based on the sworn statement, and the fact that the Mowreys knew of the
basis for their claim against Chevron before filing suit and while the bankruptcy was ongoing.
On appeal, the Mowreys have not presented any basis to show that the district court abused its
discretion by applying judicial estoppel. For this reason, the district court's summary judgment
decision should be affirmed.

C.

THE MOWREYS ARGUE ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS THAT ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL TO APPLY.

Faced with: (1) the above-referenced undisputed facts; (2) an abuse of discretion standard
ofreview; and (3) the district court's reasoned analysis on both summary judgment and on
reconsideration, the Mowreys request this Court adopt a new and different formulation of judicial
estoppel that is inconsistent with this Court's precedent.
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The Mowreys make four specific arguments. First, they argue that judicial estoppel
requires an element of intentional concealment. However, this Court has never required a showing
of intentional concealment for the doctrine to apply. Second, they argue that judicial estoppel
requires that there be nexus or privity between the prior statement and the current position. Fatal
to the Mowreys' argument is that this Court has unequivocally rejected privity as a requirement
in A&J Construction Co., Inc. Third, they argue that judicial estoppel does not apply because
Chevron was not prejudiced. This Court, however, has expressly rejected a showing of prejudice
by the moving party. Finally, the Mowreys argue that they "cured" their bankruptcy schedules
and thus judicial estoppel does not apply. However, the cases they rely on for this argument,
including the five intermediate appellate court cases from Georgia, are readily distinguishable and
are not consistent with the formulation of judicial estoppel by this Court.
1.

Judicial Estoppel Does Not Require a Finding of Intentional Concealment.

The Mowreys argue that the district court abused its discretion because it did not require
Chevron to prove intentional concealment, which they argue is a prerequisite to judicial estoppel.
See App. Br. at 13. The Mowreys then argue that the district court misapplied the summary

judgment standard by failing to credit the Mowreys' affidavit testimony that they did not
intentionally conceal their claims. App. Br. at 14. The Mowreys cite Eighth Circuit and Third
Circuit decisions to support their argument that judicial estoppel requires a finding of intentional
concealment. See App. Br. at 16 (citing Stallings v. Bussmann Corp., 44 7 F .3d 1041, 1049
(8th Cir. 2006) and Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 363 (3rd
Cir. 1996)). Yet, those decisions are not relevant or persuasive because in Idaho, judicial estoppel
does not require a finding of intentional concealment. Instead, the determinative factor in deciding
whether a plaintiff is playing fast and loose with the court is what is known or should have been
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known at the time the original position was adopted. McKay, 130 Idaho at 155, 937 P.2d at 1229;

Heinze, 145 Idaho at 236, 178 P.3d at 601.
Given this standard, as articulated by this Court in numerous cases, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in applying judicial estoppel even though the Mowreys submitted
affidavits stating that they did not intentionally conceal the claims from the bankruptcy court.
Instead, as the district court recognized, the relevant fact under McKay, Heinze, and A&J

Construction Co., Inc. is that the Mowreys knew of the facts giving rise to their claim against
Chevron yet they failed to disclose it in bankruptcy and never sought to amend their schedules
even after they had filed a lawsuit. R. Vol. I, p. 147 (quoting A&J Constr. Co., Inc., 141 Idaho at
686, 116P.3dat 16).

2.

Judicial Estoppel Applies Without a Finding That the Inconsistent Statements
Arose Out of the Same Transaction.

The Mowreys also argue that judicial estoppel was improper because the inconsistent
statement to the bankruptcy court did not directly relate to the Mowreys' claim against Chevron.
App. Br. at 17, 19 (asserting that there "is no nexus between the Mowreys' need to file bankruptcy
and their claim against Chevron and Northwest."). In fact, the Court has expressly stated that a
direct relationship between the inconsistent statements is not a prerequisite to application of the
doctrine of judicial estoppel. A&J Construction Co., Inc., 141 Idaho at 686, 116 P .3d at 16
(noting that "[w]hile privity and/or detrimental reliance are often present in judicial estoppel cases,
they are not required") (quoting Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.
2002) (internal quotations and brackets omitted)).
Ignoring the statement from A&J Construction Co., Inc., the Mowreys cite Loomis v.

Church, 76 Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954), because there was a nexus between the inconsistent
positions presented in that case. Chevron certainly does not dispute that judicial estoppel should
apply in such a case. However, as noted, the Court has expressly rejected a privity requirement in
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A&J Construction Co., Inc. Whether there was a direct nexus between the inconsistent statements
in Loomis has no bearing on whether privity or nexus is a mandatory element of judicial estoppel.
The Mowreys also rely on Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147
Idaho 737, 215 P.3d 457 (2009). That case likewise does not support a finding that the district
court abused its discretion by failing to require a nexus between the Mowreys' statements in the
bankruptcy court and this lawsuit. There, the Court concluded that judicial estoppel did not apply
because there was no evidence that the plaintiffs ever obtained "a judgment, advantage, or
consideration" from a position taken in bankruptcy. Thus, the elements of judicial estoppel were
not satisfied. Id at 749, 215 P.3d at 469 (citing Loomis, 76 Idaho at 93-94, 277 P.2d at 565).
Unlike the facts in Indian Springs, in this case it is undisputed that the Mowreys received the
advantage or benefit from the sworn representations made to the bankruptcy court-they received
the benefit of the automatic stay and they had their debt discharged based on disclosures that were
inconsistent with the position they have taken in this case.
In no case has this Court said that the doctrine applies only where the parties are the same
and where the claims arise out of the same transaction. In fact, it specifically rejected such a
requirement in A&J Construction Co., Inc. Failing to interject a privity or nexus requirement into
the judicial estoppel analysis cannot have been an abuse of discretion where this Court has
expressly stated that such a requirement does not exist.

3.

Whether Chevron Has Been Prejudiced is Irrelevant to This Appeal.

The Mowreys cite New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) for the proposition
that Chevron needs to demonstrate prejudice for judicial estoppel to apply. App. Br. at 20-21.
New Hampshire does not stand for that proposition and the Idaho Supreme Court has specifically
held that Chevron need not demonstrate prejudice. A&J Constr. Co., Inc., 141 Idaho at 686, 116
P.3d at 16 (recognizing that "parties asserting judicial estoppel are not required to demonstrate
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individual prejudice" because "judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial system, not
litigants").
In New Hampshire, the United States Supreme Court stated that in determining the
applicability of judicial estoppels, one element courts may consider is "whether the party seeking
to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment
on the opposing party if not estopped." 532 U.S. at 751 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned
that, "[i]n enumerating these factors, this Court does not establish inflexible prerequisites or an
exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of judicial estoppel." Id. Thus, contrary to
the position urged by the Mowreys, prejudice is not required as the district court had flexibility to
consider the doctrine in light of the facts presented. Further, the unfair advantage or unfair
detriment factor is framed in the disjunctive. And here, as previously described, the Mowreys
received the advantage of the automatic stay and the advantage of a discharge of their debt.
Thus, even if it were required for the district court to have made factual findings on each of the
New Hampshire factors, the undisputed facts presented support the district court's findings that the

Mowreys received an unfair advantage based on their inaccurate disclosure.

4.

The Mowreys Did Not Cure the Inadequate Disclosures by Filing Amended
Bankruptcy Schedules.

The Mowreys argue that the district court abused its discretion by applying judicial
estoppel because they moved to reopen their bankruptcy to disclose their claim against Chevron
after Chevron moved for summary judgment. The Mowreys' belated attempt to amend their
bankruptcy schedules when faced with a dispositive motion does not overcome the doctrine of
judicial estoppel. The Mowreys erroneously assert that "[a]ny alleged inconsistent position that
the Mowreys took was nullified when they amended their petition and schedules." See App. Br. at
26. For their argument, they rely on a line of Georgia intermediate appellate court cases for the
proposition that they can "cure" their bankruptcy petition now, even though it has been five years
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since they made their initial representations to the bankruptcy court and more than three years
since they received the benefit from those representations. See App. Br. at 22-26 (citing CSX
Transp. Inc. v. Howell, 675 S.E.2d 306, 309-10 (Ga. Ct. Ap. 2009); McBride v. Brown, 538 S.E.2d

863 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Johnson v. Trust Co. Bank, 478 S.E.2d 629, 631 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996);
Jowers v. Arthur, 537 S.E.2d 200, 201-02 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Rowan v. George H Green Oil,
Inc., 572 S.E.2d 338 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)).

These Georgia cases apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel differently than this Court and
therefore cannot compel the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion by applying
judicial estoppel here. In A&J Construction Co., Inc., this Court adopted the Eleventh Circuit's
analysis in Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002). See A&J Constr. Co.,
Inc., 141 Idaho at 686, 116 P.3d at 12. As the Eleventh Circuit explained in that case, the "success

of our bankruptcy laws requires a debtor's full and honest disclosure. Allowing [a plaintiff] to
back-up, re-open the bankruptcy case, and amend his bankruptcy filings, only after his omission
has been challenged by an adversary, suggests that a debtor should consider disclosing potential
assets only ifhe is caught concealing them." Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1288. In CSXTransp. Inc., the
Georgia Court of Appeals quoted this language from Burnes and then concluded that Georgia state
courts simply applied judicial estoppel differently than do other courts. 675 S.E.2d 306, 308-09.
The Mowreys next cite Eubanks v. CBSK Fin. Group, Inc., 385 F.3d 894 (6th Cir. 2004).
That case is factually distinguishable and thus unpersuasive. In Eubanks, the court concluded that
judicial estoppel did not apply because the plaintiff-debtors and their counsel specifically made
the bankruptcy trustee and the bankruptcy court aware of their potential civil claims "through
correspondence, motions, and status conference requests" all before the bankruptcy action closed.
Id. at 899. In contrast, in this case, it is undisputed that the Mowreys did not disclose their

potential claims initially, when the bankruptcy action was reopened, or at any time before Chevron

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL - 19

spent the time and money to challenge the Mowreys' claim through a motion for summary
judgment. Eubanks thus supports the application of judicial estoppel in this case.
The Mowreys also rely on Finney v. the Free Enterprise System, Inc., 2001WL1157696
(W.D. Kent. March 29, 2011) for the proposition that the belated amendment cured any issues.
That case is also distinguishable. There, the district court in Kentucky applied a standard for the
application of judicial estoppel that specifically included an element of bad faith. Id at *1.
As discussed in detail above, however, the elements of judicial estoppel as stated by this Court
do not require a finding of bad faith or intentional concealment. Instead, "the knowledge that the
party possesses, or should have possessed, at the time the statement is made is determinative as to
whether that person is 'playing fast and loose' with the court." Heinze, 145 Idaho at 235-36, 178
P.3d at 600-01 (emphasis added) (quoting McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 155, 937 P.2d 1222,
1229 (1997)).
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the Mowreys would have ever disclosed their
claim against Chevron to the bankruptcy court had Chevron not expended the time and money
bringing this issue to the attention of the district court. The district court correctly applied the
controlling Idaho precedent and appropriately concluded that the Mowreys should be judicially
estopped. It can hardly have been an abuse of discretion for the district court to have followed this
Court's guidance in A&J Construction Co., Inc. instead of relying on a line of Georgia cases that
formulate the doctrine of judicial estoppel differently than it is applied in Idaho.
D.

THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED AND REJECTED THE MOWREYS' ADVICE OF
COUNSEL ARGUMENT.

The Mowreys imply, much like they did in the district court, that their failure to disclose
their claim in bankruptcy resulted from inadequate representation by an attorney who apparently
advised them that their schedules were properly prepared. App. Br. at 14 ("Both Robby and
Kim believed that their petition and schedules in the bankruptcy action had been reviewed and
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approved by attorney Thomas Hale and contained references to all of their assets."). Even if the
Mowreys had been represented by counsel, which they were not, this argument does not overcome
the application of judicial estoppel.
This Court has previously rejected the advice of counsel argument in A&J Construction
Co., Inc. In that case, the plaintiff argued in the alternative that it relied upon its attorney's advice

when it omitted its claim from bankruptcy filings and thus the claim should not be barred by
judicial estoppel. See A&J Constr. Co., Inc., 141 Idaho at 687, 116 P.3d at 17. This Court
rejected the alternative argument and held that following the advice of counsel "is not equivalent
to inadvertence or mistake and appears to have been a strategic decision made in preparation for
bankruptcy court." Id
Here, it is undisputed that the Mowreys proceeded in bankruptcy prose. R. Vol. 1, p. 34.
Even pro se bankruptcy debtors are held responsible for their omissions in form bankruptcy
documents. See, e.g., Trotter v. Bank ofNew York Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 275 P.3d 857, 862
(2012) ("Prose litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an
attorney."); In re Glass, 60 F.3d 565, 570 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a party should "not be
allowed to shield his conduct by appealing to the court for leniency as a pro se debtor"); In re
Nagel, 245 B.R. 657, 664 (D. Ariz. 1999) ("laymen who choose to represent themselves are held

to the same standards as attorneys").
In sum, regardless of whether the Mowreys were represented by counsel, they personally
declared, under penalty of perjury, that they had both read their schedules "and that they are true
and correct to the best of our knowledge, information, and belief." R. Vol. I, p. 49. Thus, as the
district court specifically noted, "the alleged inadequate representation of the Plaintiffs' attorney
does not change this court's determination regarding judicial estoppel." R. Vol. I, p. 150.
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E.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH PUBLIC POLICY.

The district court's decision is consistent with the public policy of protecting the integrity
of the legal process. Public policy supports the application of judicial estoppel when, as happened
here, a debtor fails to disclose a claim in bankruptcy. See A&J Constr. Co., Inc., 141 Idaho at 685,
116 P.3d at 15 ("'There are very important policies underlying the judicial estoppel doctrine.
One purpose of the doctrine is to protect the integrity of the judicial system, by protecting the
orderly administration of justice and having regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings. The
doctrine is also intended to prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the courts."') (quoting
Robertson Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131Idaho99, 101, 952 P.2d 914, 916 (Ct. App. 1998)); see
also Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 785 (recognizing public policy behind judicial estoppel); Ah Quin v.
County of Kauai Dept. ofTransp., 433 B.R. 320 (D. Hawaii 2010) ("The rationale for decisions
invoking judicial estoppel to prevent a party who failed to disclose a claim in bankruptcy
proceedings from asserting that claim after emerging from bankruptcy is that the integrity of the
bankruptcy system depends on full and honest disclosure by debtors of all of their assets. ... The
interests of both the creditors, who plan their actions in the bankruptcy proceeding on the basis of
information supplied in the disclosure statements, and the bankruptcy court, which must decide
whether to approve the plan of reorganization on the same basis, are impaired when the
disclosure provided by the debtor is incomplete.") (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The
Mowreys have presented no factual or legal basis to conclude that the district court abused its
discretion, particularly given the important public policy served by application of judicial estoppel
in protecting the integrity of the courts.

F.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE MOWREYS ARE NOT THE
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST.

The district court correctly held that, as an alternative basis for summary judgment, the
Mowreys are not the real parties in interest to pursue this matter. R. Vol. I, pp. 150-51; R. Vol. IL,
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pp. 232-33. As this Court recognized, "[w]hen a debtor fails to disclose an asset or claim, the
trustee is the real party in interest with exclusive standing to pursue it." R. Vol. I, p. 150 (citing

A &J Constr. Co., Inc., 141 Idaho at 688, 116 P .3d at 18 n.1 (emphasis added)). The Mowreys
do not dispute that this is the controlling law or that the trustee has never entered an appearance.
Instead, they seek reversal based on an order entered by the bankruptcy court authorizing the
Mowreys' counsel to represent the trustee as special litigation counsel. R. Vol. I, p. 157.

1.

The Mowreys Did Not Adequately Raise Real Party in Interest on Appeal.

In a mere paragraph, the Mowreys argue that the district court erred by entering summary
judgment on the alternative basis ofreal party in interest. App. Br. at 27. This Court will not
consider any argument on appeal not supported by authority. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790,
229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010). By failing to cite any case authority and making the conclusory
statement that the district court erred by entering summary judgment on this alternative basis,
the Mowreys have failed to properly preserve this issue. Thus, even if the Court concludes that
the district court erred by applying judicial estoppel, the Court should nevertheless affirm on the
district court's alternative basis for summary judgment.

2.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed the Action Based on Lack of
Real Party in Interest.

Even if the Mowreys had properly raised the issue, the district court's ruling that the
Mowreys lack standing to proceed in this action should be affirmed. The trustee has never
appeared in this action or requested to participate as a party. He also has not filed a document
abandoning the claim to the Mowreys. Instead, as referenced, the bankruptcy court's order relied
on by the Mowreys merely authorizes counsel to continue to represent both the debtors and the
trustee. Thus, as the district court recognized, the Mowreys lack standing to pursue their claim
and summary judgment is appropriate.
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The Mowreys also argue that dismissal on this ground was in error because "a reasonable
time" has not been allowed for the trustee to join this action. See App. Br. at 27. What constitutes
a reasonable time for joining or substituting the real party in interest depends upon the facts of
the case. See Conda Partnership, Inc. v. MD. Constr. Co., Inc., 115 Idaho 902, 771 P.2d 920
(Ct. App. 1989). This district court was well-positioned to decide that dismissal was appropriate
because a reasonable time had passed without any attempt to participate by the trustee. This
decision was correct and should be affirmed.

G.

CHEVRON IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL.

The entire substance of the Mowreys' appeal depends upon their contention that the
district court abused its discretion in granting Chevron's Motion for Summary Judgment. They
present no meaningful or significant legal challenge and this Court has previously addressed
and dismissed most of their arguments previously in A&J Construction Co., Inc. Under these
circumstances, attorneys' fees on appeal are appropriate because the appellate issues raised by the
Mowreys are frivolous. See Idaho Code§ 12-121; Doe v. Roe, 133 Idaho 805, 992 P.2d 1205
(1999); Knowlton v. Mudd, 116 Idaho 262, 775 P.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1989).
V.

CONCLUSION

The district court should be affirmed. The Mowreys have not presented any legitimate
argument that the district court abused its discretion. The Mowreys do not dispute knowing of
the facts underlying this lawsuit since June 2005. Given their knowledge of the facts, the
inconsistent positions taken before the bankruptcy and district courts, and the benefits received
through their inconsistent conduct, judicial estoppel was properly applied in this case.
The district court also properly held that the Mowreys lack standing to pursue their claim.
Under controlling Idaho law, the trustee in bankruptcy is the party with exclusive standing to
pursue the Mowreys' claims in bankruptcy. A significant amount of time has passed
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since Chevron first disclosed their claim to the bankruptcy court, and still the trustee did not
request leave to appear. For that reason, the district court's alternative holding dismissing the
case on the basis of real party in interest should be affirmed.
DATED: August 24, 2012.
HOLLAND & HART LLP
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